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FRAMING INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK
CHANGE: A NETWORK INERTIA PERSPECTIVE
TAI-YOUNG KIM
Sungkyunkwan University
HONGSEOK OH
Yonsei University
ANAND SWAMINATHAN
University of California at Davis
We introduce the construct of network inertia, referring to a persistent organizational
resistance to changing interorganizational network ties or difficulties that an organi-
zation faces when it attempts to dissolve old relationships and form new network ties.
Previous research has neglected the process of network change in favor of an empha-
sis on identifying beneficial content effects of networks. We emphasize the constraints
on network change and propose a multilevel conceptual model relating key sources of
network inertia to changes in network ties. We also discuss the implications of
network inertia for the evolution of networks.
In a growing body of research, scholars have
focused on changes in (i.e., entry into or exit
from) interorganizational relationships as a crit-
ical strategic option for organizations attempt-
ing to strengthen their capabilities (Hennart,
Kim, & Zeng, 1998; Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-
Lindquist, & Borgatti, 1998). If organizations are
dissatisfied with partners that do not provide
the desired resources, they attempt to change
their partners to gain access to such resources
from new partners. However, this assumed flex-
ibility in network change is limited because of
the embedded nature of interorganizational ties
(Uzzi, 1996). Once relationship-specific routines
such as certain technology-based rules or em-
bedded cultures become institutionalized be-
tween two parties, it is unlikely the firms will
replace their partners with new ones based
solely on economic motivations. In this paper we
conceptualize the constraints on network
change as network inertia—a persistent orga-
nizational resistance to changing interorganiza-
tional dyadic ties or difficulties that an orga-
nization faces when it attempts to dissolve old
relationships and form new network ties.
Research on the formation and dissolution of
interorganizational relationships has gained
much attention in management and sociology
(Gulati, 1998; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Inkpen &
Beamish, 1997; Mizruchi & Galaskiewicz, 1994).
Despite its success in explaining vital rates of
interorganizational network ties, this stream of
research has tended to explain the formation or
dissolution of interorganizational dyadic ties as
discrete events, rather than as a sequence of
events that unfold over time. Given that interor-
ganizational networks are formed, dissolved,
and reformed on a continuous basis, we view
network evolution (i.e., changes) as sequential
processes of network dissolution with old part-
ners and reformation with new ones. Several
observations follow from such an evolutionary
approach to networks.
In previous research on interorganizational
networks, scholars have paid insufficient atten-
tion to processes that constrain network trans-
formation. Instead, they have implicitly adopted
an adaptation perspective on interorganization-
al networks and have assumed that networks
are flexible enough to be created and dissolved
easily as a result of comparing returns to orga-
nizational performance with current and new
partners. Investigating only the “beneficial”
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content of networks, researchers have been
tempted to argue that changes in networks are
always beneficial as long as new partners pro-
vide better resources. Such a perspective, how-
ever, overlooks organizations that suffer from
unsuccessful network transformation and even
fail during the processes of transformation. This
approach could be termed the content-based
perspective on interorganizational networks, be-
cause it identifies only the beneficial content of
networks.
In contrast, a process-based perspective em-
phasizes the constraints on transitions from old
to new partners. The content-based perspective
on interorganizational networks is typically
subject to sample selection bias, since research-
ers only examine organizations that form net-
works with new partners successfully. Concerns
about such bias in interorganizational network
research have been raised by Podolny and Page,
who argue that “researchers must counterbal-
ance the focus on prevalence and functionality
(of networks) with an equally strong focus on
constraint and dysfunctionality” (1998: 73), but
few researchers have addressed these concerns.
Some recent research has started to shift the
emphasis from network content to network evo-
lutionary processes. Scholars have examined
the developmental processes of specific interor-
ganizational relationships in terms of how orga-
nizations negotiate, commit to, and evaluate
their relationships (Arino & Torre, 1998; Reuer,
Zollo, & Singh, 2002; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) have proposed a
process framework that describes the evolution
of alliances through repeated negotiations.
Arino and Torre (1998) have pointed out the im-
portance of procedural issues and positive feed-
back loops in maintaining interorganizational
ties when two parties renegotiate terms or con-
tracts. Similarly, Reuer, Zollo, and Singh (2002)
have explained postformation alliance evolu-
tion in terms of changes in such governance
structures as contracts, committees, and moni-
toring mechanisms. However, in research on
such developmental processes by participating
organizations, scholars have been silent on the
processes that constrain network changes.
Further, with a few notable exceptions (Ebers,
1999; Gulati, 1995; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988),
previous research has ignored constraints on
network change that arise from the properties of
existing embedded relationships. Levinthal and
Fichman (1988) have argued that relationship-
specific assets between auditors and their cli-
ents develop over time as they run their relation-
ships effectively and learn from each other.
These researchers show that tie persistence is
greater when relationship-specific assets de-
velop or when prior tie duration is long. Gulati
(1995) has argued that prior alliances based on
trust and relationship-specific routines increase
the likelihood that firms will build alliances
with the same partners in the future. And Ebers
(1999) has developed propositions on impedi-
ments to network change showing that interor-
ganizational ties are likely to be stable when
they involve a high degree of partner-specific
investment, or high setup or fixed costs, and
when the adjustment of initial network condi-
tions is costly.
Based on a partial understanding of some
constraints on network change from the prior
work, we develop an integrated theoretical
framework describing causal mechanisms for
the action of such constraints, accounting for the
roles of internal organizational characteristics,
interorganizational dyadic ties, interorganiza-
tional network positions, and factors in the ex-
ternal environment. We also show how some
internal organizational characteristics and fea-
tures of dyadic ties interact to influence the like-
lihood of network change.
We explore these constraints under a concept
of “network inertia,” drawing on the structural
inertia theory of organizational ecology (Han-
nan & Freeman, 1984, 1989; Hannan, Po´los, &
Carroll, 2002a,b,c). According to structural iner-
tia theory, inertia is not a symptom of “bad man-
agement”; rather, it is the natural result of cre-
ating a well-tuned organizational architecture
that exploits strategic advantage and synergy
(Barnett & Carroll, 1995; Hannan & Freeman,
1984). Similarly, network inertia can be regarded
not as a symptom of poorly managed interorga-
nizational networks but as a by-product of the
previously successful management of networks
that generate synergies for the participating or-
ganizations.1
1 Inertia is conceptually different from escalation of com-
mitment, a situation where a decision maker commits addi-
tional resources to a failing course of action (Staw, 1981).
Escalation of commitment is often used as an example of
bad management.
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Why has previous research paid insufficient
attention to constraints on network change? We
believe it is because the organizational theories
that have been used to support network-related
arguments have neglected such processes.
These organizational theories include transac-
tion cost theory, resource dependence theory,
and neoinstitutionalism. All share an adapta-
tion perspective on organizations, which implies
that an organization can deal with emerging
environmental problems by building optimal
structures and employing various strategies, in-
cluding cooperative interorganizational net-
works. From this perspective, interorganization-
al networks are assumed to be flexible enough
to be created and manipulated at little cost.
Thus, interorganizational networks can be used
when transactions cannot easily be conducted
through market contracts but the transaction
costs involved are not so high as to mandate
internal organization within a hierarchy (Wil-
liamson, 1975), when there is a resource gap
between the focal organization and its partners
(Baker, 1990; Miner, Amburgey, & Stearns, 1990;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), or when the quality of
actors is hard to evaluate and others make in-
ferences about their quality by examining their
interorganizational networks so as to reduce the
uncertainty about those actors (Baum & Oliver,
1992; Human & Provan, 2000; Podolny, 1993; Stu-
art, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999).
By considering primarily the beneficial effects
of networks, organizational theories based on
the adaptation perspective have neglected the
obstacles organizations face when attempting
to modify the structure of their network ties.
Consider instead the perspective proposed by
Barnett and Carroll (1995). They argue that, to
understand the differences between adaptation
and selection, the content effects pertaining to
the destination state in an organizational trans-
formation need to be separated from the costs of
undergoing the transformation (process effects).
Organizational change results in improved per-
formance only when the organization moves to a
more attractive destination state and is able to
absorb the costs of undertaking the change.
Thus, if change in network ties is treated as a
type of organizational change, then not only do
beneficial network ties need to be identified but
the disruptions caused by network transforma-
tion also need to be overcome. Such a process-
based analysis should help to increase our un-
derstanding of the evolutionary dynamics of
interorganizational ties.
Research on interorganizational network ties
often applies a rational cost-benefit calculus to
retaining and changing such ties. These ratio-
nal models assume that if the costs of maintain-
ing existing network ties are greater than their
benefits, an organization with a great need for
network change will dissolve its current ties and
form new ties without much difficulty. Although
such rational calculation may dictate that an
organization should change its ties, the organi-
zation will still experience difficulty in doing so
to the extent that it is constrained by what we
defined above as network inertia. In that re-
spect, the propositions developed below have a
ceteris paribus nature—the constraints will op-
erate even if the need for network change is
recognized. Furthermore, these arguments are
based on the assumption that organizations
seek to catch up with constantly changing envi-
ronments, and network change is one way of
aligning organizations with such environments.
For the purposes of this paper, we define net-
work change as the dissolution or replacement
of an interorganizational network tie, and we
consider only completely broken dyadic ties be-
tween two partners (e.g., Baker, Faulkner, &
Fisher, 1998) without a planned fixed duration
(Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Park & Ungson, 1997).
Sometimes, network ties are dissolved merely
because they were designed to last for a specific
duration. We do not consider network inertia as
influencing the dissolution of such ties.
INERTIAL CONSTRAINTS ON CHANGES IN
INTERORGANIZATIONAL TIES
When an organization attempts to change its
network partner, the change is greatly influ-
enced by four types of constraints derived from
network relationships among relevant social ac-
tors at four different levels: internal constraints
(intraorganizational networks), network tie–
specific constraints (interorganizational dyadic
ties),networkposition–specificconstraints (interor-
ganizational network position), and external con-
straints (the interorganizational field).
We can define an organization as a structure
in which intraorganizational interactions form
“a centralized network in which the vast major-
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ity of ties flow to or from one particular node”
(Podolny & Page, 1998: 59). Intraorganizational
networks refer to relationships among people,
subunits, teams, and departments (Krackhardt &
Brass, 1994), which often represent different in-
terests and ideologies in an organization (Cyert
& March, 1963). Accordingly, decisions about or-
ganizational structures and strategies, includ-
ing changes in interorganizational ties, are the
context for competition among groups that rep-
resent different interests or ideologies within
the organization, and changes in interorganiza-
tional ties are therefore constrained by the in-
ternal dynamics of the organization.
Network tie–specific constraints coming from
an organization’s dyadic relationships with its
partners also affect the organization during net-
work transformation, because the very benefits
that the organization has received through its
network ties lead to network inertia. From a
structural inertia perspective (Hannan & Free-
man, 1984), network inertia is not a negative
symptom of poor networks but, rather, a by-
product of successfully managed networks. The
unique relational characteristics in a particular
network tie between two parties represent the
level of attachment reflecting their entire history
of relations (Cook, 1977; Levinthal & Fichman,
1988). In building an interorganizational tie, par-
ticipating organizations develop relation-
specific assets, such as institutionalized rou-
tines and human assets, over time. These
specialized assets have been suggested as a
mechanism throughwhich the interorganization-
al tie leads to competitive advantage for those
organizations (Blau, 1964; Dyer & Singh, 1998;
Williamson, 1985). When an organization at-
tempts to change its current tie, it risks losing
the value of such relation-specific assets, per-
ceives the change as being too costly, and thus
is less likely to change its network partner
(Ebers, 1999; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988). Even
the recognition of the need for network tie
change becomes more difficult for the organiza-
tion because of its existing attachment with the
current partner (Galaskiewicz & Zaheer, 1999).
In social network research, the distinction be-
tween the properties of dyadic ties and the
global properties of the entire network is impor-
tant (Scott, 2000). Although the entire network is
derived from the configuration of dyadic ties, its
characteristics cannot be reduced simply to the
sum of the characteristics of the dyadic ties (Lin-
coln, 1982). The social structure of the entire net-
work influences an actor’s actions by constrain-
ing the set of available actions and shaping the
actor’s dispositions (Marsden, 1981) through its
position in the structure. The actor’s position in
the network also constrains other actors’ coop-
erative behaviors embedded in the closed struc-
ture (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Shan,
Walker, & Kogut, 1994). These arguments sug-
gest that an organization’s position in the con-
text of the entire network is an important con-
straint on changing its dyadic ties (Gulati, 1998).
Finally, scholars generally agree that an or-
ganization’s environment plays a significant
role in shaping its activities and performance.
Proponents of a network perspective argue that
the most significant elements of an organiza-
tion’s environment are represented by the other
organizations with which it must interact, in-
cluding key suppliers, customers, regulatory
agencies, and organizations with similar ser-
vices and products (Nohria, 1992). This environ-
ment of connections between an organization
and other social actors is often referred to as an
interorganizational field—“a field of relation-
ships that bind organizations together” (Nohria,
1992: 5). Changing organizational structures and
strategies—specifically, changing interorgani-
zational ties—depends on how an organization
interacts with other organizations in its interor-
ganizational field.
After proposing a multilevel conceptual
model of how these four different sources of net-
work inertia influence network change, we also
examine how the first two sources of constraint
(internal and network-specific constraints) gen-
erate joint inertia effects on network change.
Intraorganizational Networks As Internal
Constraints
Internal constraints on network change can be
viewed in terms of the stability and complexity
of intraorganizational networks. Intraorganiza-
tional networks tend to become stable and even
rigid, with established structures, routines, and
cultures, over time (network stability), or to be-
come complicated, with different interest groups
representing certain practices or ideologies
with increasing organizational size (network
complexity). Stable and complex networks
within an organization exert great influence on
any changes in interorganizational ties.
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Organizational age and size. New organiza-
tions tend to have lower levels of reliability and
accountability than older ones (Hannan & Free-
man, 1984). Developing trust and working rela-
tionships and acquiring a range of skills and
knowledge take time (Stinchcombe, 1965). Struc-
tural inertia increases with age as structures,
operating procedures, and roles become institu-
tionalized over time. From a network perspec-
tive, this means that the ways people and units
interact with one another become stable or even
rigid. Previous research has shown that organi-
zations are less likely to change as they age
(e.g., Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Delacroix
& Swaminathan, 1991; Miller & Chen, 1994).
Structural inertia also increases with organi-
zational size (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). As size
increases, the number of units grows and the
complexity of hierarchical linkages and rela-
tionships among people and units also in-
creases. A larger number of units and longer
chains of hierarchical relationships reduce the
speed with which an organization can reorga-
nize in response to environmental changes
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Hannan et al., 2002b).
Several studies have shown that larger organi-
zations are less likely to change (e.g., Delacroix
& Swaminathan, 1991), while other studies have
shown that midsize organizations are the most
likely to change (e.g., Haveman, 1993). Taken
together, these studies suggest that organiza-
tional inertia makes organizations less likely to
undertake architectural change that results in
long cascades of change, and such architectural
change damages organizational performance,
at least for a short period of time (Hannan et al.,
2002b,c).
Changes in interorganizational ties can be
considered a type of organizational change,
and, thus, structural inertia in older and larger
organizations may reduce the speed of dissolv-
ing old ties and establishing new ones in a
changing environment. An older organization
with a history of established employment rela-
tions, experiences, and routines may find it hard
to replace current partners with new ones, be-
cause such changes often require high levels of
commitment and significant resources. As size
increases, an organization may experience com-
plexity arising from coordinating a large num-
ber of units and managing hierarchical sets of
linkages and relationships among people and
units. This increased complexity leads to diffi-
culty in reconciling different interests among
individuals and groups when attempting to find
new partners for core activities. The networks of
older and larger organizations therefore are ex-
pected to exhibit a greater degree of network
inertia.
Proposition 1: The older an organiza-
tion, the less likely it is to change its
network ties.
Proposition 2: The larger an organiza-
tion, the less likely it is to change its
network ties.
Organization’s past history of network
change. A complete understanding of organiza-
tional change requires consideration of an orga-
nization’s history of changes. Organizations
learn from what they have done in the past and
become better at it with experience (Argyris,
1999; Hannan & Freeman, 1989; March, 1991). As
they accumulate knowledge and experience in a
set of activities, their propensity to repeat these
activities increases accordingly (Amburgey et
al., 1993; Dobrev, Kim, & Hannan, 2001).
The propensity to maintain consistency in or-
ganizational action by modeling current behav-
iors on past actions also applies to changes in
networks. Gulati (1995) reports that, as the num-
ber of past alliances increases, the likelihood an
organization will form a new alliance with the
same partner also increases. Similarly, an orga-
nization’s prior experiences with network
change are expected to increase the likelihood
of change in its network ties in the future. Once
an organization knows how to change its net-
works and manage the processes during net-
work transformation, it becomes more experi-
enced at that particular kind of organizational
change. This know-how concerning interorga-
nizational network change has been conceptu-
alized as “alliance capability,” which refers to
an organization’s ability to identify partners, ini-
tiate alliances, and engage in the ongoing man-
agement, possible restructuring, and termina-
tion of these alliances (Khanna, 1998). This
alliance (or network) capability allows the orga-
nization to better absorb the collective knowl-
edge generated in networks, allows it to reach
its network goals quickly, and frees it to pursue
new goals that require network changes (Lars-
son, Bengtsson, Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998).
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Furthermore, an organization with prior expe-
rience in implementing network change may
draw on this cumulative experience to deal with
various problems arising from internal and ex-
ternal factors. An organization that succeeds in
solving problems based on knowledge gained
from past network changes tends to have a
higher propensity to change network ties when-
ever it needs to solve new problems. Based on
this reasoning, we expect repetitive momentum
to increase the likelihood of future network
changes.
Proposition 3: The greater the number
of network changes that an organiza-
tion has previously experienced, the
more likely it is to change its network
ties.
Interorganizational Dyadic Ties As Network
Tie–Specific Constraints
The characteristics of dyadic ties that reflect
relation-specific assets and previous attach-
ment between partners make tie changes harder
to achieve. Previous research on interorganiza-
tional attachment (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Levinthal
& Fichman, 1988) has shown that, in the devel-
opment of interorganizational ties, dyadic tie
characteristics emerge, lead to benefits, and be-
come constraints on network changes in terms
of four key dimensions: relational, knowledge-
sharing, institutionalized, and cognitive.
The relational dimension of interorganization-
al ties involves relationship-specific interper-
sonal ties between the agents of participating
organizations developed through long-term per-
sonal interactions (Doz, 1996; Luo, 2001; Madhok,
1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Although these
personal relationships play a critical role in
maintaining interorganizational ties by prevent-
ing the occurrence of cheating, such strong per-
sonal relationships may lock an organization
into unproductive relations with its partners,
and they possibly may lead to network inertia
(Galaskiewicz & Zaheer, 1999).
The knowledge-sharing dimension involves
collective learning (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Powell,
Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996), in which participat-
ing organizations tend to develop expertise pe-
culiar to their partners’ needs (Levinthal & Fich-
man, 1988). However, this partner-specific
learning can constrain the organization’s further
innovation and network change strategies
(Levinthal & March, 1993).
The institutionalized dimension involves in-
stitutionalized routines, such as certain rules,
norms, taken-for-granted behaviors among par-
ticipating organizations, and the bureaucratic
and technical structures that emerge within an
interorganizational tie. Once these network-
specific routines and structures are institution-
alized, they are less subject to change and, thus,
become constraints because of the high setup or
fixed costs involved (Ebers, 1999).
The cognitive dimension involves cultural
values and goals that are shared by the partners
in an interorganizational tie. Successful collab-
oration often requires cognitive integration of
employees in the participating organizations, as
well as the creation of a shared identity, cultural
values, and ideology (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998;
Parkhe, 1991), thereby reducing the possibility of
opportunistic behavior (Ouchi, 1980). However,
these shared identity and cultural values within
the tie lead to organizational members’ strong
attachment to the current tie and, thus, their
resistance to network tie change.
Using these four dimensions of interorganiza-
tional network ties as an analytical framework,
we explore the question of how dyadic tie char-
acteristics influence the likelihood an organiza-
tion will change its network partners. Consis-
tent with recent research (Dyer & Singh, 1998),
the strategic behavior of an organization in a
network tie may be mainly influenced by the
previous history, the total volume (scale), and
the breadth (scope) of its dyadic tie with its
partner. Thus, we examine how network tie du-
ration, size, and multiplexity influence the like-
lihood the focal organization will change its net-
work tie.
Network tie duration. From a structural inertia
perspective, network inertia represents the past
success of network ties. The duration of network
ties between partners has been suggested as
one indicator of the successful performance of
interorganizational ties (Geringer & Hebert,
1991; Kogut, 1988). Parkhe (1993) has argued that
longer tie duration results in a reduction in each
partner’s perception of opportunistic behavior
by the other, an increase in trust, and a greater
possibility of resolving conflict among the part-
ners in a dyadic tie. Persistent network ties in-
dicate past success and, thus, possible inertia,
2006 709Kim, Oh, and Swaminathan
and an organization may find it difficult to
change such long-lived ties.
What specific mechanisms then increase the
degree of network inertia and make network
partner change harder? The relational dimen-
sion of a dyadic tie involves personal bonds
between agents of the participating organiza-
tions established through repetitive interactions
in the network tie development process (Arino &
Torre, 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Personal
relationships based on trust restrain each actor
from taking advantage of its partner organiza-
tion (Seabright, Levinthal, & Fichman, 1992). Be-
cause of the affective nature of personal rela-
tionships and the enormous costs of building
trust, however, these long-lasting personal rela-
tionships can also become a source of network
inertia resistant to network partner change (cf.
Krackhardt, 1994).
A long-lasting dyadic tie also facilitates the
development of greater relation-specific exper-
tise and generates knowledge useful only in the
context of the current network tie. Organizations
are often myopic in their learning, relying too
much on exploiting existing knowledge instead
of exploring new directions (Levinthal & March,
1993). As a result of successful learning experi-
ence in a long-lasting relationship, an organiza-
tion becomes specialized in niches in which its
previous experience with the current partner
yields advantages. However, the organization
also becomes increasingly removed from other
bases of experience and knowledge that it could
potentially explore (David, 1985). Thus, the orga-
nization becomes both more reluctant to change
its network tie and vulnerable to environmental
change.
In network ties of longer duration, an under-
standing of the normative and technical charac-
teristics—and of the specific styles of partners—
becomes institutionalized through informal and
formal routines (Doz, Olk, & Ring, 2000). These
highly partner-specific routines and structures
in a long-lived network tie can result in network
inertia because of the high setup or fixed costs
of specialized systems and relevant equipment
and technology (Ebers, 1999). In the context of
auditor-client relationships, Levinthal and Fich-
man (1988) have shown that the dissolution of a
longer-term auditor relationship with a specific
client is more difficult, because the auditing
firm has built the accounting system and has
accumulated know-how peculiar to the specific
client over a long period of time.
Attachment and commitment in a relationship
affect the members’ attitudes, beliefs, goals, and
values (Salancik, 1977). As a result of long tie
duration, the partners influence each other’s or-
ganizational culture and assimilate elements of
the other culture. Employees in each organiza-
tion increasingly feel familiar with employees
in the partner organization, and they identify
themselves as members of an interorganization-
al tie rather than as members of separate orga-
nizations. These shared values and identity may
influence the likelihood an organization will
change its network partner. Based on these ar-
guments, network inertia is expected to increase
with the duration of network ties, and the orga-
nization will find it increasingly difficult to
change its network partners.
Proposition 4: The longer the duration
of an organization’s network ties, the
less likely it is to change them.
Network tie size. The size of a network tie
represents the total volume—the scale as-
pect—of the participating organizations’ in-
volvement in a specific network tie, and it can
be measured by such indicators as the total cap-
ital invested in the tie or the total sales or profits
related to the dyadic tie. Because a larger net-
work tie may lead to more frequent transactions,
possibly greater tie benefits, and a higher level
of interdependence and commitment (Dyer &
Singh, 1998), the partners become subject to a
common fate, thus impeding network tie
change.
Individuals in boundary-spanning positions
may acquire more power within their organiza-
tion as the organization’s business activities be-
comemore dependent on the network tie and the
success of the network tie becomes more critical
for the survival of the participating organiza-
tions (cf. Gulati, 1998). Furthermore, more fre-
quent interactions from greater involvement in a
tie may result in closer personal relationships
between interacting agents in the participating
organizations. These individuals may develop
shared political interests in favor of the continu-
ity of the network tie. Boundary spanners re-
sponsible for network tie maintenance therefore
resist network tie change.
Collective knowledge generation or collective
learning is one of the important outcomes of
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alliances (Powell et al., 1996). A large-scale dy-
adic tie makes the partners recognize their
strong interdependence. This recognition of a
common fate encourages the partners to pursue
common rather than private benefits from the
dyadic tie by achieving collective learning
through joint efforts (Khanna, 1998). However,
collective learning also requires greater rela-
tion-specific expertise and investment in proce-
dures for knowledge sharing, potentially lead-
ing to greater network inertia.
Larger organizations require more formalized
and bureaucratic structures. Similarly, a large-
scale network tie requires effective structures
and technical routines to coordinate the differ-
ent interests of the participating organizations,
an effective communication system for a smooth
flow of information (Monge et al., 1998), and an
effective governance system to control the col-
laboration process associated with a highly in-
terdependent large-scale tie (cf. Gulati & Singh,
1998). This greater investment in specific struc-
tures and institutionalized routines makes
changes in the large-scale tie particularly un-
likely.
In a large-scale network tie, employees in par-
ticipating organizations often develop a shared
identity and shared norms and values that af-
fect network tie stability (Borys & Jemison, 1989).
Through this process, people in the participat-
ing organizations start to identify themselves
with the network tie as a separate entity. Be-
cause of organizational members’ cognitive at-
tachment to the current tie and their resistance
to changes in this tie, the organization becomes
locked into the existing network relation rather
than pursues new network opportunities. Thus,
a larger network tie, representing the scale of tie
involvement, tends to increase network inertia
and to make network change more difficult.
Proposition 5: The larger the size of an
organization’s network ties, the less
likely it is to change them.
Network tie multiplexity. In social network re-
search, multiplexity refers to the extent to which
two actors are linked together by more than one
relationship in a network (Verbrugge, 1979). In
the context of an interorganizational network,
network tie multiplexity represents the breadth—
the scope aspect—of the involvement of partici-
pating organizations, possibly measured by the
number of business functions the network tie en-
compasses (e.g., R&D and manufacturing), the
number of products produced in the network tie, or
the number of markets the network tie serves (cf.
Killing, 1988).
Individual actors involved in multiplex rela-
tionships are less able to withdraw from their
existing ties, because withdrawal in one context
may jeopardize existing relationships in other
contexts (Mitchell, 1969). Previous research has
suggested that network multiplexity constrains
individual actors’ behaviors, decreases the per-
meability of actors’ networks to new relations,
and draws those actors into existing networks
(Jackson, Fischer, & Jones, 1977; Minor, 1983).
Similarly, network multiplexity in an interorga-
nizational tie indicates how much the network
tie between partners is imbued with obligations
to and expectations about each other (cf. Feld,
1997; White, Boorman, & Breiger, 1976). There-
fore, network multiplexity may lead to stronger
network inertia and may constrain the likeli-
hood an organization will change network part-
ners.
If a dyadic tie involves different business
functions, the set of employees who are involved
in the network tie from diverse functional areas
on each side and who share a personal interest
in the success of the tie is thus larger and leads
to greater resistance to network change. Fur-
thermore, the greater level of embeddedness as-
sociated with multiplex ties (Feld, 1997) may
lead to closer relationships, and to greater soli-
darity and trust, among boundary spanners.
Thus, the personal relationships of the large
number of people involved on each side of the
existing tie lock the organization into the exist-
ing relationship.
In a multiplex network context, participating
organizations rely on synergy across various
functional areas to pursue collective learning.
An organization with a multiplex tie needs to
integrate the expertise and knowledge gained
in various functional areas, because innovation
and learning in one area influence learning in
other areas. As this partner-specific knowledge
sharing spreads through more diverse func-
tional areas, the organization is subject to
greater network inertia.
A multiplex tie also requires more complex
mechanisms to coordinate the network interac-
tions of the participating organizations across
multiple functions. Formal management struc-
tures, such as the governance system and tech-
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nical and other institutionalized routines, need
to be consistent, integrated, and specific to the
partner across various functional areas. For in-
stance, changing the partner in a multiplex tie
involves simultaneously changing manufactur-
ing technology, institutionalized marketing
know-how, and the corresponding accounting
system. The change of the multiplex tie is there-
fore harder to implement.
Through greater interaction among a larger
number of employees involved in various func-
tional areas, and through the use of integrated
mechanisms, the partners can better understand
each other. The enforceable trust and solidarity
that emerge from the embedded nature of net-
work multiplexity lead to stronger identification
of employees in the participating organizations
with the current network tie (cf. Portes & Sensen-
brenner, 1993). Thus, we expect tie multiplexity,
representing the scope of tie involvement, to
increase network inertia.
Proposition 6: The more multiplex an
organization’s network ties, the less
likely it is to change them.
Interorganizational Network Positions As
Network Position–Specific Constraints
Beyond the dyadic tie between two partners,
an organization’s actions, such as network
change, are also constrained by its position in
the entire network, which is not reducible to
aggregates of the characteristics of dyadic ties
(Lincoln, 1982). Whereas a network position with
structural holes involves an actor’s active net-
work positioning to reduce the uncertainty it
faces, a position of high status is related to other
actors’ perceptions of the ability of the actor to
reduce the uncertainty they face (Podolny, 2001).
We examine how an organization’s network po-
sition in terms of structural holes and status in
the entire network influences the organization’s
likelihood of network partner change.
Structural holes as network position. Struc-
tural holes are the gaps between disconnected
social actors, and structural hole theory empha-
sizes the importance of bridging ties connecting
different social actors (Burt, 1992; see Fernandez
& Gould, 1994, and Marsden, 1982, for further
discussion of the concept of brokerage). Social
actors who act as brokers, connecting otherwise
disconnected groups, receive the best and most
timely information, because brokers have con-
tacts on each side of a hole and have access to
nonredundant information flows from discon-
nected groups (Burt, 1992, 1997). Social actors
who span structural holes are also able to con-
trol the flow of information, because the discon-
nected groups communicate only through these
brokers (Burt, 1992; Fernandez & Gould, 1994;
Gould, 1989). Thus, a structural hole–rich posi-
tion provides an organization with access to di-
verse and timely information in the network and
confers it with structural autonomy.
These benefits from a structural hole–rich po-
sition enable an organization to be less subject
to network inertia by increasing its networking
capabilities. The occupation of a structural
hole–rich network position can reduce an orga-
nization’s uncertainty about its market deci-
sions, including exchange partner choices. An
organization in a hole-rich position tends to
have more diverse information about market op-
portunities and risks, the ways to realize these
opportunities and to deal with the risks, and the
availability of potential new partners (Burt, 2000;
Podolny, 2001). The structural autonomy and,
thus, control over resource flows derived from a
structural hole–rich position facilitate initia-
tives in strategic actions, such as changing net-
work partners, instead of merely responding to
the actions of other actors in the network (Gnya-
wali & Madhavan, 2001). Therefore, organiza-
tions that span structural holes tend to be more
active and to take the initiative in changing
their network partners; organizations with fewer
structural holes are expected to exhibit greater
network inertia and to be less likely to change
their network partners.
Proposition 7: The more structural
hole–rich position an organization oc-
cupies, the more likely it is to change
its network ties.
Status as network position. Status has been
suggested as an important structural and posi-
tional characteristic of an organization (Gulati,
1998; Podolny, 1993). Status in a network typi-
cally has been indicated by central positioning
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994), by affiliation with
high-status partners (Stuart et al., 1999), or by
recognition from high-status peers (Podolny,
1994). The high status of an organization pro-
vides signals about the quality of the organiza-
tion to other social actors in the network and
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reduces the uncertainty faced by other social
actors in choosing exchange partners (Podolny,
1993, 2001).
High status facilitates an organization’s prom-
inence in the network, and its prominence and
visibility enable the high-status organization to
have greater access to critical resources, such
as information, financial capital, human capital,
and better potential network partners (Fombrun,
1996; Knoke & Burt, 1983). Low-status organiza-
tions lack access to critical resources and face
greater difficulties in dissolving existing ties,
identifying potential partners, and successfully
implementing network partner change. Further-
more, because potential exchange partners pre-
fer building ties with high-status organizations,
high-status organizations tend to have more op-
tions and greater discretion in their choice of
partners (Podolny, 2001). In contrast, low-status
organizations tend to have fewer options and
face greater constraints derived from network
inertia (cf. Jones et al., 1998). Consistent with this
argument, Baker et al. (1998) have shown that an
organization’s status is positively related to its
rate of dissolution of ties with clients.
Proposition 8: The higher an organiza-
tion’s status, the more likely it is to
change its network ties.
Interorganizational Fields As External
Constraints
An organization’s external environment can
be viewed as the interorganizational field in
which it is embedded. The interorganizational
field consists of both technical and institutional
environments, each of which plays a pivotal role
in shaping organizational behavior (Scott &
Meyer, 1991). Theories of technical environments
tend to emphasize competitive relationships
among organizations; those of institutional en-
vironments tend to focus on patterns of conform-
ing to rules or beliefs to gain legitimacy from
other social actors. Competitive and institu-
tional forces are destabilizing and stabilizing
forces on market exchanges and interorganiza-
tional networks, respectively (Baker et al., 1998;
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott & Meyer, 1991).
Technical environment. Among the most sa-
lient aspects of the technical environment are
the competitive relationships among organiza-
tions. Previous research has shown that compet-
itive intensity increases the rate of organization-
al change. For instance, greater competitive
pressure results in higher R&D expenditures
and innovation rates (Stuart, 1999), and it en-
courages changes in organizational market po-
sitions (Dobrev et al., 2001).
Similarly, more intense competition is ex-
pected to lead to changes in interorganizational
networks. Baker et al. (1998) found that competi-
tion increases the rate of dissolution of the ties
between advertising agencies and their clients.
Stuart (1998) showed that crowding in technolog-
ical space promotes the likelihood of alliance
formation among semiconductor companies. An
increasing number of firms with competing de-
signs increase market uncertainty (Hannan &
Freeman, 1989), especially in industries featur-
ing rapid technological innovation (Tushman &
Anderson, 1986).
When an organization faces high market un-
certainty and needs to catch up with new tech-
nologies, forming new interorganizational net-
work ties with new partners who have
marketing and technological capabilities helps
it improve its performance (Nohria & Garcia-
Pont, 1991). A greater expectation of learning
from new partners makes new tie formation an
attractive option for firms, thus lowering the de-
gree of network inertia. Conversely, in a less
competitive environment, an organization has
less need to gain competitive advantage by
forming alliances with others because of the
relative stability and low uncertainty.
Proposition 9: The more competitive
the environment, the more likely an
organization is to change its network
ties.
Institutional environment. The central idea of
neoinstitutionalism (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) is
that an organization tends to conform to norms
and cultural codes in a community or society to
gain legitimacy and, thus, to improve its perfor-
mance or survival chances (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Zuckerman (1999)
has demonstrated that the failure to acquire so-
cial legitimacy imposes an economic penalty on
organizations in a financial market.
The dissolution and formation of interorgani-
zational ties are among the many aspects of
organizational behavior constrained by external
legitimacy or norms. Changes in interorganiza-
tional networks might be difficult when there
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are strong norms constraining such changes in
an industry or a community. For example, when
a firm changes its auditor, the firm’s stock price
drops, because investors suspect that the firm is
shopping for more favorable interpretations of
its accounting practices (Fried & Schiff, 1981;
Levinthal & Fichman, 1988). In the investment
banking industry, the relational norm of corpo-
rations having loyal sole-source ties with banks
was prevalent in the 1970s (Eccles & Crane,
1988). This relational norm shifted to transac-
tional norms of multiple-source ties with banks
in the 1980s. Likewise, advertising, law, and
other professional services also experienced
such shifts in the 1980s (Baker et al., 1998).
When an industry has a relational norm of
loyal sole-source ties with clients, firms have a
propensity to conform to the norm to gain exter-
nal legitimacy. In a similar fashion, in a com-
munity where bounded solidarity and enforce-
able trust are salient (Portes & Sensenbrenner,
1993), selecting a new partner that is not seen as
a member of the community or that does not
conform to community norms might meet with
disapproval from other network members, al-
though forging relations with the new partner
may be economically rewarding (e.g., in a for-
eign direct investment setting).
Proposition 10: The stronger the pres-
sure on an organization to conform to
an institutional environment, the less
likely it is to change its network ties in
ways that violate the institutional en-
vironment.
Interactions Between Internal and Network
Tie–Specific Constraints
We further develop propositions based on the
interactions between internal and network tie–
specific constraints associated with a focal or-
ganization to illustrate the dynamic relationship
between the two types of constraints. In partic-
ular, we examine the interactive effects of or-
ganizational age and organizational size (i.e.,
internal constraints) and network tie duration
and network tie size (i.e., network tie–specific
constraints) on the likelihood of network change,
respectively.
Interaction between organizational age and
network tie duration. Are the negative effects of
network tie duration on network change greater
for older organizations with rigid intraorganiza-
tional networks among different interest groups,
or for younger organizations with more dynamic
intraorganizational networks? Relation-specific
assets derived from interorganizational ties are
more valuable for younger organizations com-
pared to older organizations because of the vul-
nerability of young organizations. The liability
of newness argument (Stinchcombe, 1965) sug-
gests that newly founded organizations suffer
from a lack of stable relationships and sufficient
resources, are highly vulnerable to environmen-
tal change, and have a high propensity to fail
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Thus, researchers
have shown that interorganizational network
ties are particularly beneficial for young orga-
nizations in mitigating the risks of newness and
yielding better performance (Baum, Calabrese,
& Silverman, 2000; Shan et al., 1994). However,
younger organizations face greater difficulty in
finding and establishing successful network
ties (Aldrich, 1999; Stinchcombe, 1965). Develop-
ing trust and external legitimacy takes time,
and younger organizations tend to suffer from a
lack of legitimacy and resources. Under these
difficult conditions, once young organizations
establish a few relatively long-lived network re-
lationships with specific network partners, they
may find it more difficult to change those part-
ners and may be less likely to change their
network ties because of the potential loss of
accumulated investment in relationship-spe-
cific assets.
Recent research on the network characteris-
tics of entrepreneurial organizations has shown
that, during the emergence stage of its life cycle,
an organization relies on relationships with
family (Bhappu, 2000) and close friends to gain
the key resources needed to establish organiza-
tional viability (Larson & Starr, 1993). The pro-
portion of embedded ties within the organiza-
tion’s network and the cohesiveness of the
network decrease as the new organization
moves from emergence to early growth (Hite &
Hesterly, 2001). An embedded and cohesive net-
work tends to constrain an organization’s net-
work expansion beyond the boundaries of the
current network (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993).
Thus, the tendency of younger organizations to
have more embedded and cohesive networks
makes it more difficult for them to change their
network ties.
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Proposition 11: The effect of network
tie duration on network change is
likely to be greater for younger orga-
nizations than for older organizations.
Interaction between organizational size and
network tie size. How does the scale of network
involvement differentially influence larger or-
ganizations with complex intraorganizational
networks among different interest groups,
compared to smaller organizations with sim-
ple intraorganizational networks, in terms of
their network change activities? Having rela-
tively large-scale involvement with a specific
partner makes a smaller organization more
vulnerable to network change. Large-scale
network involvement represents a high level
of interdependence and commitment between
partners. Because of this high interdepen-
dence, changing a large-scale network partner
is more critical for a smaller organization com-
pared to a larger organization. Although small
organizations tend to attempt structural
change more often, they are also more likely to
fail and die in the process, because any
change in core activities takes time and en-
tails costs (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Stinch-
combe, 1965).
Further, because of their weak market posi-
tions and lack of legitimacy, smaller organiza-
tions find it relatively more difficult to build
beneficial network relationships with other or-
ganizations. Cases of successful large-scale
network involvement between small organiza-
tions and their partners are rare. The depen-
dence of small organizations on their network
partners, where network involvement is large in
scale, is proportionally more important relative
to that of large organizations. Thus, smaller or-
ganizations find it relatively more difficult to
change their large-scale network ties (Larsson
et al., 1998).
Proposition 12: The effect of network
tie size on network change is likely to
be greater for smaller organizations
than for larger organizations.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The concept of network inertia has been de-
fined as a persistent organizational resistance
to changing interorganizational network ties, or
the difficulties an organization faces during net-
work transformation. The specific mechanisms
behind network inertia can be explained at mul-
tiple levels: how an organization’s internal con-
text (intraorganizational networks), network tie–
specific context (interorganizational dyadic
ties), network position (interorganizational net-
work position), and external environment (in-
terorganizational field) constrain network
change, and how internal and network tie–
specific constraints jointly affect network
change.
Thus, formulating the constraints on network
change provides fresh insights into a vibrant
stream of research on interorganizational rela-
tionships: network evolution. Researchers have
previously drawn attention to the need to study
the longitudinal dynamics of networks (Emir-
bayer & Goodwin, 1994). Studies of network
evolution, however, have been undertheo-
rized, because in previous research on interor-
ganizational networks, scholars have adopted
an adaptation perspective—framing network
effects in terms of searching for beneficial net-
works while ignoring difficulties in imple-
menting network change. Conceptualizing
network evolution from a network inertia per-
spective facilitates focusing on the constraints
an organization faces in the network transfor-
mation process.
Another reason previous network research fo-
cused on identifying network ties that improve
performance is that the theoretical arguments of
this stream of research have been derived
mainly from organizational theories with an ad-
aptation perspective, such as transaction cost
economics, resource dependence theory, and
neoinstitutionalism. Drawing instead on orga-
nizational ecology allows researchers to explain
the mechanisms through which network inertia
arises at the aforementioned four levels. Com-
bining organizational ecology and network
analysis is not novel (see Burt, 1992; DiMaggio,
1986; Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Podolny, Stuart,
& Hannan, 1996). However, efforts to integrate
the two perspectives revolve around basic con-
cepts such as niche or structural equivalence to
find significant effects of covariates in statisti-
cal models. This new perspective may facilitate
shifting the theoretical foundations of network
evolution research from an adaptation-oriented
perspective to a selection-oriented perspective.
Drawing on structural inertia theory highlights
the importance of transformation processes in
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network evolution, focusing on the possible dif-
ficulties and impediments in network change
processes.
This network inertia concept is an attempt to
fill a gap in the development of interorganiza-
tional network theory. The focus of previous
interorganizational network and strategic al-
liance research has progressed from network
formation and network dissolution to network
development. Previous network research has
shown how initial conditions of organizations
affect network tie formation (Oliver, 1990) and
dissolution (Park & Ungson, 1997), and it has
described the process through which the net-
work itself develops (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994),
while leaving unanswered questions about net-
work evolution. The network inertia perspective
in this paper should thus provide a more inte-
grated understanding of network evolution
through the initial conditions of organizations
and environments, network formation, network
benefits, network development processes, net-
work change, and network dissolution. For ex-
ample, this approach should facilitate exploring
how initial conditions in the organizations in a
network (e.g., similarity of partners) affect net-
work inertia during network change, and
thereby network dissolution (cf. Doz et al., 2000).
The propositions formulated above also have
implications for the effects of network change on
organizational performance. An organization
that changes its network ties, when network in-
ertia is high, may experience lower performance
than other organizations with lower network in-
ertia, at least for a short period of time. Chang-
ing network ties disrupts structures, routines,
and cultures developed from relationships with
previous partners. An organization’s absorptive
capacity to learn from its partners might shrink
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), and a “learning race”
between former collaborators might begin
again (Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998).
Often, it takes a substantial amount of time
and effort to develop good relationships with
new partners. Therefore, changes in network
ties may set back the liability of newness clock
and, thus, reduce organizational performance
and elevate organizational mortality rates (cf.
Amburgey et al., 1993; Dobrev et al., 2001; Han-
nan & Freeman, 1984). However, once the orga-
nization overcomes the obstacles and impedi-
ments it faces during network transformation
and makes the right choice of partners, the or-
ganization should achieve superior perfor-
mance. Future research may use longitudinal
research designs to explore the question of how
changes in network ties affect organizational
performance.
Because this framework has broad applicabil-
ity to different units of analysis, the propositions
can be extended to interpersonal networks, in-
terunit networks in a corporation, or intercountry
networks, such as treaties or alliances. For ex-
ample, they might help one understand why
some interpersonal networks (e.g., friendships,
marriages, information networks, working rela-
tionships in academic and business areas, affil-
iation networks with voluntary associations) are
stable over time, although individuals may pur-
sue ties based on self-interest. Our argument
implies that individuals’ propensity to change
interpersonal networks are constrained by the
four different sources of network inertia in the
paper. Although we think that some proposi-
tions should be modified when applied to inter-
personal, interunit, or intercountry networks, we
expect that the network inertia perspective is
useful for explaining the evolution of those
types of networks. Just as interorganizational
networks are subject to inertial forces, so are
friendship, interunit, or country-level networks.
This paper also suggests the need for more
research on the role of changes in external en-
vironments, along with the evolution of network
ties. Theories of the industry or product life cycle
(Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Klepper, 1996) and
evolutionary theories (Nelson & Winter, 1982),
including organizational ecology (Carroll &
Hannan, 2000; Dobrev, Kim, & Carroll, 2002; Han-
nan & Freeman, 1989), share a common view that
different phases of industry evolution matter for
organizational action and performance. Differ-
ent phases of industry evolution could be sys-
tematically related to changes in technology, in
the availability of network partners, in the
asymmetric bargaining power between buyers
and sellers, in political environments including
government regulations, and in the industry net-
work structure. For example, the effects of the
constraints in our propositions might vary, de-
pending on the network structure in which the
focal organization resides. The organization
might be embedded in tightly dense networks
with relatively few structural holes and a high
level of mutual dependency or, conversely, in
loosely connected open networks. Although we
716 JulyAcademy of Management Review
believe that our arguments are still valid, hold-
ing other factors constant, future research
should address these issues of dealing with dif-
ferent aspects of external environments as im-
portant factors in explaining changes in interor-
ganizational networks.
In conclusion, network ties can contribute to
successful adaptation, but it is important to rec-
ognize that an organization also faces difficul-
ties and obstacles when it attempts to change
its network ties, and these constraints are de-
rived from the organization’s internal, network-
specific, network position–based, and external
characteristics. The multilevel model from a net-
work inertia perspective allows a better under-
standing of network evolution by focusing on
the process of network transformation, while
emphasizing the effects of constraints on net-
work change.
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